United States ex rel. [Sealed]
United States ex rel. Xxxxxxxxxx x. Xxxxx, et al., No. 14-cv-00551 (D.D.C.); and
United States ex rel. Xxxxxx x. Xxxxx, 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970). There ex- ists some authority, however, that except under exi- gent circumstances a warrant is required to enter the defendant’s own premises, United States x. Xxxxxxx, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976); United States x. Xxxxxxx, 506 F.2d 166 (D.C.Cir. 1974); Xxxxxx x. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir. 1970), or, at least, to enter the premises of a third party, Virgin Islands x. Xxxxxx, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); Xxxxxx x. Xxxx, 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); Xxxxxxx x.
United States ex rel. [Sealed] v. [Sealed], as disclosed to Bank of America, to the extent it alleges any false or fraudulent statements, claims, and/or certifications to United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or the GSEs in connection with the reimbursement of costs or expenses incurred in connection with foreclosure-related proceedings anywhere in the United States (including foreclosure proceedings or other proceedings, such as bankruptcy or eviction proceedings, involving claims or issues relating to foreclosure), any failure to comply with, or any false or fraudulent statements, claims, and/or certifications to United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or the GSEs concerning compliance with, quality control and/or monitoring requirements applicable to such costs or expenses.
United States ex rel. Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx; Xxxxxx Xxxx; and Xxxxxx Xxxxxx v. CHSI, et al., Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, et al. ex rel. Mason v. CHSI, et al., United States ex rel. Xxxxxx v. CHSI, et al., United States, et al. ex rel. Xxxxxxx v. CHSPC, et al.,
United States ex rel. Xxxxxx.258 In Xxxxxx, the debtor munici- pality had been ordered by the court to levy certain taxes and to use the proceeds to pay its creditor.259 The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an order. Federal courts could not be- come the de facto mayors of state municipalities: “[T]he question, what ex- penditures are proper and necessary for the municipal administration, is not judicial; it is confided by law to the discretion of the municipal authorities. No court has the right to control that discretion, much less to usurp and supersede it.”260
United States ex rel. Xxxxx x. UNDER SEAL, No. XX-cv-XXXX (D.N.J.)
United States ex rel. Sealed v. Sealed, Civil No. 12-CV-7199 (S.D.N.Y.) [UNDER SEAL]
United States ex rel. [Sealed] v. [Sealed], as disclosed to Bank of America.
United States ex rel. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. President R.C.-St. Regis Management Co., No. 7:02-CV-845, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12456, at *3-*4, *9-*10 (N.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 451 F.3d 44 (2nd Cir. 2006). The NIGC has defined the term management contract as “any contract, subcontract, or collateral agreement between an Indian tribe and a contractor or between a contractor and a subcontractor if such contract or agreement provides for the management of all or part of a gaming operation.” 25 C.F.R. § 502.15. Collateral agreement is defined as “any contract, whether or not in writing, that is related either directly or indirectly, to a management contract, or to any rights, duties or obligations created between a tribe (or any of its members, entities, organizations) and a management contractor or subcontractor (or any person or entity related to a management contractor or subcontractor).” 25 C.F.R. § 502.5. Though its regulations do not define management, NIGC has said that it encompasses activities such as planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling. NIGC Bulletin No. 94-5: “Approved Management Contracts v. Consulting Agreements (Unapproved Management Contracts are Void).” Accordingly, the definition of primary management official is “any person who has the authority to set up working policy for the gaming operation.” 25 C.F.R. § 502.19(b)(2). Further, management employees are “those who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decision of their employer.” N.L.R.B. x. Xxxx Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974). Whether particular employees are “managerial” is not controlled by an employee’s job title. Xxxxx x. M.S.P.B., 19 F. 3d 1395 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Rather, the question must be answered in terms of the employee’s actual job responsibilities, authority and relationship to management. Id. at 1399. In essence, an employee can qualify as management if the employee actually has authority to take discretionary actions — a de jure manager — or recommends discretionary actions that are implemented by others possessing actual authority to control employer policy — a de facto manager. Id. at 1399 citing N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672, 683 (1980). If a contract requires the performance of any management activity with respect to all or part of a gaming operation, the contract is a management contract within the meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 2711 and requires the NIGC Chairwoman’s approval. Management con...
