United States ex rel. [Sealed] v. [Sealed], as disclosed to Bank of America;
United States ex rel. Xxxxxxxxxx x. Xxxxx, et al., No. 14-cv-00551 (D.D.C.); and
United States ex rel. Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxxxxx, 477 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973); Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxxx, 472 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1972); Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxxxx, 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971). Thus, the procedure authorized under subdivision (c)(2) is not ob- jectionable on the ground that the oral statement is not transcribed in advance of the issuance of the war- rant. People x. Xxxx, 38 Cal.App.3d 993, 113 Cal.Rptr. 806 (1974). Although it has been questioned whether oral testimony will suffice under the Fourth Amendment if some kind of contemporaneous record is not made of that testimony, see dissent from denial of certiorari in Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx x. Xxxxxxxxxx, 393 U.S. 1090 (1969), this problem is not present under the procedure set out in subdivision (c)(2). The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants issue ‘‘upon probable cause, supported by Xxxx or affirma- tion.’’ The significance of the oath requirement is ‘‘that someone must take the responsibility for the facts alleged, giving rise to the probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.’’ United States ex rel. Xxxx x. Xxxx, 401 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1968); See also Xxxxxxx x. Rob- erts, 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971). This is accomplished under the procedure required by subdivision (c)(2); the need for an oath under the Fourth Amendment does not ‘‘require a face to face confrontation between the mag- istrate and the affiant.’’ People x. Xxxxxx, 27 Cal.App.3d 883, 104 Cal.Rptr. 247 (1972). See also People x. Xxxxxxx, 26 Cal.App.3d 7, 103 Cal.Rptr. 153 (1972), noting it is unnec- xxxxxx that ‘‘oral statements [be] taken in the physical presence of the magistrate.’’ Page 155 TITLE 18, APPENDIX—RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 41 The availability of the procedure authorized by sub- division (c)(2) will minimize the necessity of federal law enforcement officers engaging in other practices which, at least on occasion, might threaten to a great- er extent those values protected by the Fourth Amend- ment. Although it is permissible for an officer in the field to relay his information by radio or telephone to another officer who has more ready access to a mag- istrate and who will thus act as the affiant, Xxxxx v. United States, 370 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1966); State x. Xxxxx, 250 N.C. 728, 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959), that procedure is less desirable than that permitted under subdivision (c)(2), for it deprives ‘‘the magistrate of the opportunity to examine the officer at the scene, who is in a much bet- ter position to answer questions relating to probable cause and...
United States ex rel. Xxxx x. Xxxxxxxxx, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting there ‘‘is much to be said for the rule . . . which assumes prejudice and nonwaiver if there has been no on-the-record inquiry by the court as to the hazards to defendants from joint representa- tion’’; United States x. Xxxxxxx, 470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1973); United States x.
United States ex rel. [Sealed] v. [Sealed], as disclosed to Bank of America, to the extent it alleges any false or fraudulent statements, claims, and/or certifications to United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or the GSEs in connection with the reimbursement of costs or expenses incurred in connection with foreclosure-related proceedings anywhere in the United States (including foreclosure proceedings or other proceedings, such as bankruptcy or eviction proceedings, involving claims or issues relating to foreclosure), any failure to comply with, or any false or fraudulent statements, claims, and/or certifications to United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or the GSEs concerning compliance with, quality control and/or monitoring requirements applicable to such costs or expenses.
United States ex rel. Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx; Xxxxxx Xxxx; and Xxxxxx Xxxxxx v. CHSI, et al., Case Xx. 0-00-xx-00000 (X.X. Xxxx.) Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, et al. ex rel. Mason v. CHSI, et al., Case No. 3:12-cv-817 (W.D.N.C.) United States ex rel. Xxxxxx v. CHSI, et al., Case No. 10-C-0959 (N.D. Ill) United States, et al. ex rel. Xxxxxxx v. CHSPC, et al., Case No. 1:09-cv-00007 (N.D. Ind.)
United States ex rel. Xxxxxx x. Xxxxx, 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970). There ex- ists some authority, however, that except under exi- gent circumstances a warrant is required to enter the defendant’s own premises, United States x. Xxxxxxx, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976); United States x. Xxxxxxx, 506 F.2d 166 (D.C.Cir. 1974); Xxxxxx x. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir. 1970), or, at least, to enter the premises of a third party, Virgin Islands x. Xxxxxx, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); Xxxxxx x. Xxxx, 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); Xxxxxxx x.
United States ex rel. Xxxxxx.258 In Xxxxxx, the debtor munici- pality had been ordered by the court to levy certain taxes and to use the proceeds to pay its creditor.259 The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an order. Federal courts could not be- come the de facto mayors of state municipalities: “[T]he question, what ex- penditures are proper and necessary for the municipal administration, is not judicial; it is confided by law to the discretion of the municipal authorities. No court has the right to control that discretion, much less to usurp and supersede it.”260
United States ex rel. Xxxxx x. UNDER SEAL, No. XX-cv-XXXX (D.N.J.)
United States ex rel. West v. Skilled Healthcare Group Inc., et. al., 11- 02658-EDL (N.D. Cal.); United States ex rel. Xxxxxx v. Skilled Healthcare Group, Inc. et al., Civ. 4:14-cv-00219 (W.D. Mo.); United States ex rel. Xxxxxx x. Skilled Healthcare Group, Inc. et al., Civ. 14-cv-860 (W.D. Mo.).
