Employee Interests Sample Clauses
Employee Interests. Employees of Client may need verification of employment and/or income to qualify for home loans, automobile loans, chattel loans, social services programs, confirm immigration status or obtain worker’s compensation payments. The Work Number® provides the necessary verification on a timely basis.
Employee Interests. Employees of City may need verification of employment and/or income to qualify for home loans, automobile loans, chattel loans, social services programs, confirm immigration status or obtain worker’s compensation payments. The Employment Verifications service provides the necessary verification on a timely basis.
Employee Interests. (a) Buyer is aware and expressly acknowledges that certain current and former employees of, or independent contractors to, Seller or a Subsidiary of Seller (each, a “Covered Employee”) are entitled to receive a portion of any proceeds distributed to Seller (or a Subsidiary of Seller) in respect of certain of the Covered Interests in the event that certain specified investment return thresholds are satisfied, pursuant to either (i) an express written assignment of an economic interest in a Covered Interest made by Seller (or a Subsidiary of Seller) to a Covered Employee or (ii) a written agreement by Seller (or a Subsidiary of Seller) to pay to a Covered Employee an amount equal to a specified portion of the amounts received by Seller (or a Subsidiary of Seller) in respect of a Covered Interest (each, a “Letter Agreement”) (the interests of the Covered Employees described in the foregoing clauses (i) and (ii) are collectively referred to herein as “Employee Profit Participation Interests”). Effective as of the Closing, Buyer hereby assumes and agrees to be liable for, and indemnify and hold Seller (and any Subsidiary of Seller that is a party to a Letter Agreement) and the CB Parties harmless from and against, the obligations of Seller (or any Subsidiary of Seller) with respect to payments due and payable from and after the Closing under the Employee Profit Participation Interests that exist on the date of the Closing, except for any Employee Participation Interest that relates to any Covered Interest excluded by the CB Parties from the purchase and sale hereunder pursuant to Section 1.6(c)(v), Section 1.6(d) or Section 1.6(e). In addition, following the Closing, Buyer agrees to use commercially reasonable efforts to provide for the Employee Participation Interests (except for any Employee Participation Interest that relates to any Covered Interest excluded by the CB Parties from the purchase and sale hereunder pursuant to Section 1.6(c)(v), Section 1.6(d) or Section 1.6(e)) to be cashed out only when the related Asset(s) are sold (rather than on a sale by Buyer (or a Subsidiary of Buyer) of its direct or indirect interest(s) in any such Asset(s)).
(b) Each of Seller and Buyer acknowledges and agrees that for purposes of calculating the amount payable to any Covered Employee by Buyer pursuant to any Letter Agreement:
Employee Interests. The ownership interests in the Company of the Employee Members, as may be issued and outstanding from time to time in accordance with Section 6.2. An Employee Interest may include a Employee Liquidation Preference to the extent a Employee Liquidation Preference is given to an Employee Member as part of the grant of an Employee Interest. The current ownership of the Employee Interests is set forth on Exhibit A. Each Employee Interest shall be further designated with a series number, such as "Series 1 Employee Interest." Each successive issuance of Employee Interests shall be designated with the next consecutive integer following the numerical designation for the Employee Interests issued most recently prior to such issuance. All Employee Interests issued concurrently shall be assigned the same numerical series designation. The term "Employee Interests" shall include all series of Employee Interests.
Employee Interests. At this point, contract enthusiasts may simply harken back to the general brief for freedom of contract and market ordering. Contract is said to be an efficient mechanism for allocating entitlements in accordance with the parties’ preferences. Even con- tractual provisions that appear burdensome to employees may be pre- sumed mutually beneficial where freely bargained, if only by virtue of what the apparently burdened party presumably received in exchange. Of course, in the employment setting these presumptions seem heroic at best to many observers. That is especially true here, given the pres- ence of public interests and the proximity of nonwaivable employee rights. But we might put a little substantive meat on those formalistic bones by pointing out that both arbitration and non-compete agree- ments are said to have built-in benefits for employees as well as em- ployers—not only some presumed trade-off elsewhere in the employ- ment contract, but particular benefits that flow from the agreements themselves. They are touted as “win-win” propositions. Non-compete covenants are said to benefit employees by freeing employers to share valuable information, making employees more productive and earn- ing them a higher wage during employment. Arbitration is said to be faster, cheaper, and more accessible than litigation; employees may find it easier to get a hearing and even some relief.105 This quid pro employment with a competitor on these grounds). The “inevitable disclosure” doc- trine effectively implies a non-compete covenant in rare cases, and is highly controver- sial. Whatever its merits, it cannot rest on the proposition that no employee right is at stake, for the employee is losing not just the non-right to appropriate trade secrets, but the larger right to engage in one’s occupation, including in competition with the em- ployer. 105 A party agreeing to submit claims to arbitration gives up no substantive rights or remedies; she simply “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇ Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., ▇▇▇ ▇.▇. ▇▇▇, 628 (1985). The quid pro quo of arbitration distinguishes predispute arbitration agreements from predispute agreements to waive the right to a jury trial or to participate in aggregate or class ac- tions (that, plus the utter lack of statutory authority for the latter). A jury trial waiver or class action waiver for fut...
