Public Serv Sample Clauses
Public Serv. Comm’n, 000 X.X.0x 000 (Xx.Xxx. 1989). Accordingly, the Signatory Parties do not believe that it is necessary to establish a procedural schedule or to set this case for a “live” evidentiary hearing. Section 393.170.3 RSMo 2000 provides the Commission with the power to grant a certificate of convenience and necessity “after due hearing.” The Court of Appeals in Xxxxxxxxxxxx discussed what is required by the word “hearing” in Section 393.170.3:
Public Serv. Comm'n of State v.
Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 198 P.3d 1258 (Colo. App. 2008). Radio Dog Ranch asserts that the denial of year-round access has a direct monetary component which can be quantified and for which the government entity under an inverse condemnation theory would be liable. The County is a state agency and as such is subject to liability for wrongful acts. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The owners of Radio Dog Ranch have a property interest which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The County cannot engage in a due process violation of the property interest of Radio Dog Ranch without being liable for its actions. Xxxxx Xxxxxxxx, on behalf of Radio Dog Ranch, has worked hard to communicate with the County staff and to get its approval of this year’s Winter Maintenance Agreement. He has also provided you with the facts of this case so that the Board can make a well-informed decision in favor of Radio Dog Ranch. Approving the Winter Maintenance Agreement the years 2017- 2018 is consistent with all applicable law. Xxxx Xxxxxxx makes clear that there will not be any physical damage from the ranch plowing activity. Also, public safety requires that public vehicle access on County Road 5 be separate from cross-country skier routes. The County has a 60-foot wide right-of-way on County Road 5 and there is no practical reason why cross-country skiers cannot be kept off the driving service of County Road 5. A denial of this application is contrary to applicable law. The Morrisons relied upon the representations of the County in building their house on the property. Colorado law recognizes that estoppel is a remedy against government entities where the private party has relied upon the government representation to their detriment. In addition Resolution No. 2016-019 is based upon the faulty legal premise that cross-country skiing is a legal activity on a County road. Ouray County is restricted by the Right to Farm Act to not significantly interfere with agricultural activities. Here, the evidence is clear that year-round wheeled vehicle access is necessary to continue the agricultural activities on radio dog Ranch. Colorado law recognizes that private property owner should be compensated for a government action and constitutes an inverse condemnation of private property rights. The United States Constitution protects the rights of Radio Dog Ranch from illegal actions by the County.
Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (In order to succeed on a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), the movant must present evidence that is truly newly discovered or [] could not have been found by due diligence.” (quotations, alterations and citation omitted)); State St. Bank & Trust Co.
Public Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983). They note that in Arkansas Electric, the Arkansas Public Service Commission (“PSC”) “asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by the Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation (“AECC”) to its member retail distributors, all of whom are located within the state.” IP Reply Brief, at 20-21. The AECC challenged the PSC’s assertion of jurisdiction as violating the dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court rejected the utility’s challenge to regulation of its intrastate activities: [S]xxxx regulation of the wholesale rates charged by AECC to its members is well within the scope of "legitimate local public interests," particularly considering that although AECC is tied into an interstate grid, its basic operation consists of supplying power from generating facilities located within the State to member cooperatives, all of which are located within the State.
Public Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 400 Md. 1, 21, 926 A.2d 238 (2007). Thus, our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss. Id. 7Appellees’ motions were also based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and lack of a necessary party. We do not base our decision on these grounds. Appellant contends that the court erred in concluding that a Government Dispute existed, within the meaning of the Contract. Xxxxxxxxx argues the mere contention by appellees that NIH may be responsible is insufficient, and in order to have a Government Dispute, SMCI and BRC had to present a certified claim to the NIH contracting officer. Appellant points out that it sought damages caused by XXXX’s negligent and intentional conduct and breach of contract, itemizing approximately 20 specific instances. Appellant’s position is that what is required to constitute a Government Dispute under the Contract is the same as that required to invoke jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act, i.e., the filing of a certified claim. Appellant also observes that if a mere contention that NIH may be liable is sufficient to constitute a Government Dispute, it would render meaningless the provisions in the Contract permitting appellant to sue SMCI in Maryland courts with respect to disputes between the parties herein. Appellant argues that this case is governed by §§ 7.6.3 and 7.8.1 of the Supplement. Section 7.6.3 provides that SMCI shall be liable for its own gross negligence, intentional misconduct and material breach of contract. Section 7.8.1 of the Supplement provides that, except as set forth in § 7.6.1, disputes between appellant and SMCI shall be subject to mediation and, if necessary, litigation. In the event of litigation, the section further provides that appellant and SMCI consent to jurisdiction and venue in the courts of Maryland. Second, appellant contends that, even if a Government Dispute existed, the court erred in concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the Contract Disputes Act does not extend to disputes between parties who do not have a contract with the federal government, and (2) parties cannot by contract change the scope of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Xxxxxxxxx argues that BRC is the contractor under the Contract Disputes Act and, thus, is the only party that can assert a viable claim against the NIH. Third, in the alternative, appellant contends that the court erred...
Public Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 388-389 (1983) (noting that until Congress or the relevant executive agencies made it clear that federal policy preempted state jurisdiction, or until a regulation so “seriously compromised important federal interests,” “[w]e will not … in this facial challenge to the [state agency’s] mere assertion of jurisdiction assume that such a hypothetical event is so likely to occur as to preclude the setting of any rates at all.”). IP Reply Brief, at 14, footnote # 34. different. IP Reply Brief, at 16. Unlike the NGA and NGPA, which purposefully and expressly preempted certain state regulation of natural gas pipelines, Congress never occupied the field of oil pipeline regulation. Id. Instead, the ICA left power over intrastate oil pipelines to the states. IP Reply Brief, at 16; 49 U.S.C. §1(2); Xxxxxxx 230 U.S. at 417; Texas v. Eastern T. R. Co., 258 U.S. 204, 217-218 (1922); Xxxx Inlet, 836 P.2d at 350-51; National Steel Appeal, 919 F.2d at 41. FERC concurs, and is definitive in its understanding that the NGA cases “do not control” oil pipeline cases. IP Reply Brief, at 16; In re Amoco Pipeline Co., 62 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,119, 61,803- 804 (Feb. 8, 1993); see also In re Amoco Pipeline Co., 67 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,378 (June 23, 1994) (“while the ICA and the NGA both apply to the movement of hydrocarbons through underground pipeline systems, the two acts differ considerably in purpose and scope”). The Indicated Parties maintain that these fundamental and critical differences between federal regulation of natural gas pipelines and oil pipelines should not be foreign to Laurel counsel, Xxxxxx’s experts, the Congressional Research Service, or other industry publications. IP Reply Brief, at 16-17, referring to Xxxx, Xxxxxxxxxxx X., Unfinished Business: FERC’s Evolving Standard For Capacity Rights On Oil Pipelines, 32 Energy X. X. 563, 565 (2011) 16; Laurel St. No. 9-R, at 917; Congressional Research Service, Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas and Crude Oil: Federal and State Regulatory Authority, Xxxxxxx X. Xxxxxxx (March 28, 2016) 18; and Xxxxx, Xxxx X. and 16 Xxxxxx’s outside counsel in the present matter, Xxxxxxxxxxx X. Xxxx, Esq., wrote the following in a 2011 article for the Energy Law Journal: The limited scope of the FERC’s regulation of oil pipelines stands in xxxxx contrast to its pervasive role in pipeline infrastructure under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), which even prohibits a would-be pipeline sponsor from putting a shovel in the ground until a ce...