EDITORIAL NOTE. On March 2, 1970, as talks between West German State Secretary Xxxx and Soviet Foreign Minister Xxxxxxx resumed in Moscow, the Embassy in Bonn submitted an assessment of “Soviet views on politi- cal agreements with [West] Germany.” Within the next few months, the Embassy suggested, the Soviet Union would decide whether to pro- ceed with negotiations not only in Moscow but also in Warsaw and East Berlin: “it appears likely that a decision to move or not to move will govern all three. Moscow, not Poland or the GDR, will make the final decision.” The Soviets were probing to determine what the West Germans would concede at the bargaining table, a process that, while advanced in Moscow, was just beginning in East Berlin. Although the available evidence was insufficient to determine the course of Soviet policy, the Embassy concluded that, since “losses from breaking off the negotiations outright appear to outweigh gains,” the Kremlin would allow the talks to continue. The outlook for a settlement on Berlin, which would be affected by success but not necessarily failure in Moscow, was less certain. The Embassy judged the “chances for agree- ment on limited practical improvements on Berlin whether in written form or not to be about fifty-fifty.” (Telegram 2295 from Bonn, March 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR) The Embassy in Moscow contributed to the analysis, maintaining that the Kremlin would play a “waiting game” before making any deci- sions. According to the Embassy, the Soviets sought accommodation for several reasons—the domestic economy, the Chinese threat, a possible European security conference—but would probably insist on nothing less than “full acceptance by Bonn of Moscow’s view of the ‘realities’ ” of the Second World War. (Telegram 1212 from Moscow, March 11; ibid.) The Mission in Berlin emphasized East Germany and the quadri- partite talks as complicating factors and noted that: “we see little likeli- hood of the Soviets pressing the East Germans to modify substantially existing practices affecting Berlin to suit Western requirements.” The Mis- sion concluded: “This does not mean that we should not negotiate or not exploit the forthcoming discussions to see what benefits might be achieved. It means, however, that as we go into talks, we ought to have few illu- sions about what can be accomplished. While Soviets must carefully consider implications of Berlin talks for wider relationships, fact is that on Berlin Sovi...
EDITORIAL NOTE. On February 3, 1970, Polish Ambassador Xxxxxxxxxxx met Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx at the White House to review the status of East-West nego- tiations, in particular the upcoming first round of the Warsaw talks. The discussion included an exchange on formal recognition of the Polish-East German border, the so-called Oder-Neisse line: “He [Xxxxxxxxxxx] said that the US could contribute by telling the FRG that we wanted an agreement settling the border. Xx. Xxxxxxxxx said that we had made clear that we want reconciliation between Poland and the FRG. Xxxxxxxxxxx said this was not enough. Xx. Xxxxxxxxx said that we would present no obstacle to Polish-German understanding.” Xxxxxxxxxxx told Xxxxxxxxx he considered the latter remark an “important” statement of X.X. xxxxxx. (Memorandum for the record by Xxxxxxxxxxx, February 9; National Archives, Xxxxx Presidential Mate- rials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I) One week later the West German Foreign Office instructed its Em- bassy in Washington to confirm a report from the Polish delegation in Warsaw that a White House “personality,” although not the President himself, recently told Xxxxxxxxxxx that the United States would not object if West Germany recognized the Oder-Neisse line. On February 12 Xxxx Xxxxxx, the German Minister in Washington, accordingly raised the issue with Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxxx who admitted that Xxxxxxxxx had remarked that the United States would “present no obstacles to German-Polish understanding” but denied any implication on the border issue. (Memorandum for the record by Xxxxxxxxxxx, February 12; ibid., Box 683, Germany, Vol. IV) In a meeting with Counselor Xxxxxxxxxxx of the Polish Embassy on March 17, Xxxxxxxxxxx suggested that such Polish behavior might pres- ent an obstacle for bilateral relations. When Xxxxxxxxxxx stressed “how important it was for the US and other allies to encourage the Germans to settle the Oder-Neisse,” Xxxxxxxxxxx was blunt in his reply: “I took occasion to tell him that the Poles would make a bad mis- take if they tried to play the Western allies off against each other on this question. I had been very disturbed to learn that Xx. Xxxxxxxxx’x general comments to the Polish Ambassador about our support for German-Polish reconciliation had been passed on to the Germans by Polish officials in a version that had us supporting the Polish inter- pretation of Potsdam. I also noted that an American journalist in Xxxx- xxxxxx had told me that Xx. Xxxxxxxxx’x a...
EDITORIAL NOTE. The reader will find below a complete amended version of the Treaty establishing the European Community as it results from Title IV of the TEU: Provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [Article I(1) to (29)].
EDITORIAL NOTE. The Department of Health and Human Services issued a notice of waiver regarding the requirements set forth in part 46, relating to protection of human subjects, as they pertain to dem- onstration projects, approved under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, which test the use of cost—sharing, such as deductibles, copayment and coinsurance, in the Medicaid program. For further information see 47 FR 9208, Mar. 4, 1982. SOURCE: 82 FR 7259, 7273, Jan. 19, 2017, un- less otherwise noted.
EDITORIAL NOTE. After January 1, 1979, ‘‘Budget of Expenses and Rate of Assess- ment’’ regulations (e.g., sections .200 through .299) and ‘‘Handling’’ regulations (e.g., sections .300 through .399) which are in effect for a year or less, will not be carried in the Code of Federal Regulations. For FED- ERAL REGISTER citations affecting these reg- ulations, see the List of CFR Sections Af- fected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at xxx.xxxxx.xxx. Sec. 980.1 Import regulations; Irish potatoes. 980.117 Import regulations; onions. 980.212 Import regulations; tomatoes. 980.501 Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and maturity requirements.
EDITORIAL NOTE. The Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, adopted on 30 June 1982, on various measures to improve the budgetary procedure is reproduced on p. 865 of Volume I.
EDITORIAL NOTE. Text of the heading as supplemented by the Single Article of the Council Decision of 21 February 1983 adding a number of products to the list in Annex I to the ECSC Treaty (OJ L 56, 3.3.1983).
EDITORIAL NOTE. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the SEA, and for historical reasons, the term 'Assembly' has not been replaced by the terms 'European Parliament'.
Article 2 The European Parliament of the Community shall forward each year to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe a report on its activities.
Article 3 The Commission shall communicate each year to the Committee of Ministers and to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe the general report provided for in Article 17 of this Treaty.
Article 4 The Commission shall inform the Council of Europe of the action which it has been able to take on any recommendations that may have been sent to it by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe under Article 15(b) of the Statute of the Council of Europe.
Article 5 The present Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the Annexes thereto shall be registered with the Secretariat of the Council of Europe.
Article 6 Agreements between the Community and the Council of Europe may, among other things, provide for any other type of mutual assistance and cooperation between the two organizations and indicate the appropriate forms thereof. Done at Paris this eighteenth day of April in the year one thousand nine hundred and fifty one. XXXXXXXX Xxxx XXX ZEELAND X. XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXX Xxx. BECH STIKKER XXX XXX XXXXX The representatives of the Federal Government have several times declared in the course of the negotiations on the European Coal and Steel Community that the status of the Saar can be finally settled only by the Peace Treaty or a similar Treaty. Furthermore, they have declared in the course of the negotiations that in signing the Treaty the Federal Government is not expressing recognition of the present status of the Saar. I would repeat this declaration and would ask you to confirm that the French Government agrees with the Federal Government that the status of the Saar can be finally settled only by the Peace Treaty or a similar Treaty and that the French Government does not view the Federal Government's signature of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty as recognition by the Federal Government of the present status of the Saar. I am, Sir, (Signed) XXXXXXXX Paris, 18 April 1951 In reply to your letter of 18 April 1951, the French Government notes that the Federal Government in signing the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community does not intend recognition of the present status ...
EDITORIAL NOTE. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the SEA, and for historical reasons, the term 'Assembly' has not been replaced by the terms 'European Parliament'.
EDITORIAL NOTE. On February 10, 1970, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Xxxxxxx met Ambassador Xxxx in Moscow to deliver the Soviet response to the Western proposal of December 16 for talks on Berlin. (Telegram 715 from Moscow, February 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) The text of the Soviet aide-mémoire, Febru- ary 10, reads: “The Government of the USSR has acquainted itself with the United States Government aide-mémoire, which was the answer to its (Soviet) statement of September 12, 1969. It confirms the readiness ex- pressed in this statement for an exchange of views for the purpose of improving the situation in West Berlin and of eliminating frictions in this region. The Soviet Government is also guided by the fact that it is necessary to approach this question in the context of the tasks of nor- malizing the situation and of ensuring security in Europe. “Bearing in mind the purpose of the exchange of opinions, as it is formulated by the parties, the Soviet Government considers it impor- tant, first of all, to reach agreement on excluding activity incompatible with the international situation of West Berlin, which was and remains a source of tension existing here. In the conditions of the continuing occupation of West Berlin and the absence of other joint settlements, only the Potsdam and other quadripartite agreements and decisions can be the basis in principle during an examination, in particular, of practical questions regarding this city. It is self-evident, moreover, that questions of the communications of West Berlin and of access to it can- not be settled in isolation from the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic within which West Berlin is situated and whose lines of communications it uses for its external ties. “Corresponding to the subject of an exchange of views, the Soviet Government would agree that meetings of the representatives of the Four Powers should take place in West Berlin in the former Control Council Building. It appoints as its representative for conducting ne- gotiations P.A. Abrasimov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo- tentiary, who will be ready to enter into contact with the U.S. Repre- sentative empowered to do so, beginning in the second half of February 1970. Organizational and technical questions could be clarified through the usual channels.” (Attached to memorandum from Xxxxxxxxxx to Xxxxx, February 13; ibid., POL 38–6) In a February 13 memorandum to the Presi...
