Policy Response. NEFOS versus XXXXXXX The foreign policy doctrine that possibly best reflected Xxxxxxxx’x ideology was the concept of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) constantly struggling against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS). This doctrine was arguably the most dominant political platform from which Xxxxxxxx dealt with the events that unravelled before Indonesia on the world stage. The New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) were the newly independent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the socialist bloc, and the progressive organizations and individuals in the capitalist countries while the Old Established Forces were defined as the old colonialist powers that prevented the development of the new nations, intervened militarily against them, and had infiltrated their cultures. The NEFOS were fighting against Colonialism, Imperialism, Capitalism, and all defenders of the status quo – essentially they wanted to build a new world order without l’exploitation de nation par nation et de l’homme par l’homme (exploitation of nation by nation and of man by man). Essentially, President Xxxxxxxx had set out to challenge the forces of NEKOLIM, an acronym coined by Lt. Gen. Xxxxx Xxxx that stood for neocolonialism, colonialism, and imperialism. According to Leifer (1983, 57), one of Xxxxxxxx’x biographers explained that XXXXXXX was the 1960’s version of the anti-imperialism of the 1920’s whereby direct colonial control was replaced by economic domination or Western political spheres of influence. Xxxxxxxx used the background of NEKOLIM to rally Afro-Asian support for Indonesian initiatives to expel Western political presence in the Southeast Asian islands and to promote national unity via his own charismatic leadership (Xxxxxxxxx 1967, 202- 203). At the first conference of the non-aligned states, held in Belgrade in September 1961, President Xxxxxxxx provided a critique of the structure of the international system that differed from the view held by the Non- aligned Movement, which was essentially the central view of India’s Nehru, Egypt’s Xxxxxx, and Yugoslavia’s Xxxx: Prevailing world opinion … would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers. I think that is not true. There is conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man and that is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination (Leifer 1983, 58). It is worthwhile to note that Xxxxxxxx’x ide...
Policy Response. Assertiveness towards the United States of America Given Xxxxxxxx’x structuralist and confrontationalist outlook on the world, Indonesia’s assertiveness towards the United States of America was simply a natural stance given the extensive U.S. involvement in the world developments pertaining to Indonesia, and the fact that the United States was one of the poles in the then bipolar international order of the Cold War. Xxxxxxxx’x foreign policy assertiveness towards the United States of America can be attributed to three factors: West Irian, Malaysia, and the combination of NEFOS/OLDEFOS and the Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang Axis. During the negotiations on the transfer of West Irian from the Netherlands to Indonesia, despite U.S. pressure on the Dutch behind the scenes, no US representatives were present. This absence of the Indonesian requested US representatives from the negotiations created the impression that the United States had withdrawn its guarantee to underwrite the agreement. This impression was further exacerbated by xxx Xxxxxxxx Plan aid of USD 506 million to the Netherlands in the spring of 1948, and by the nonchalant US positions recorded in the United Nations and votes taken in the UN Security Council. Hence, although international pressure mainly from the United States and the United Nations greatly assisted the eventual transfer of West Irian, many Indonesians felt that American interests coincided more closely with the colonial powers than with the newer countries (Xxxxxxxxx 1967, 51-53). At the beginning of the Malaysia issue, the United States had been critical of the United Kingdom’s insensitivity towards Indonesia and tried to mediate. However, due to its own involvement in Vietnam and sensing that President Xxxxxxxx was against all foreign presence in the area, the United States aligned its position with that of the United Kingdom and supported the establishment of Malaysia (Hauswedell 1973, 19-20). Things turned ugly when aid was cut off by the United States after the launch of the Crush Malaysia Campaign in 1963 and President Xxxxxxxx blasted the United States with the famously colorful ‘go to hell with your aid’ retort spoken in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Xxxxxx Xxxxx (Xxxxxxxxx 1967, 226). Precipitated by Indonesia’s close relations with China, relations with the United States went downhill from then on. The PKI was allowed to boycott U.S. films and seize the U.S. Information Service (USIA) in Yogyakarta. Trainin...
Policy Response. Confrontation over West Irian West Irian is a case that clearly showed the dynamics when a structuralist viewpoint (expelling an imperialist force out of one’s sphere of influence, or more aptly in this case, one’s territory) and a confrontationalist approach (coercive diplomacy) were joined. West Irian had been an integral part of the Netherlands East Indies. The Round Table Conference on December 1949 held in The Hague stipulated that the issue of West Irian would be discussed within a year. At the time Indonesia’s form of modern political existence was structured into that of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. This form of republic had been a member of the Netherlands –Indonesian Union headed by the Dutch Queen. With the issue of West Irian still unresolved in 1949 at the Round Table Conference, although there was a stipulation to discuss the issue by 1950, on the third anniversary of the proclamation of independence President Xxxxxxxx in 1948 pointed out that: The Indonesians have entered the international arena. If not instantly, the world gradually will undoubtedly participate in the settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. This is what has become the basis of the foreign policy of the Republic (Leifer 1983, xiii). President Xxxxxxxx continued to elaborate that the struggle to free West Irian was part of the struggle to eradicate imperialism and colonialism worldwide and explained that: I never said ‘let us bring West Irian into the territory of the Republic,’ I always say ‘let us bring West Irian into the sovereign territory of the Republic.’ And that the Indonesian Flag does not fly there is due to the fact that Dutch imperialism is still there (Xxxxxxxx 1961, 57-58). To project the image that he obtained legitimacy from the state, President Xxxxxxxx continually referred to the opinion of the Supreme Advisory Council that the policy on the liberalization of West Irian ought to be based on the principle of confrontation of national power with the power of Dutch imperialism-colonialism – ‘a confrontation between our macht (power) and the macht of Dutch imperialism-colonialism’ (Soekarno 1960, 43). Euphoric from having just obtained independence and not seeing progress on the issue of West Irian, in an address commemorating the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of independence President Xxxxxxxx announced again that Indonesia would fight to secure the freedom of Xxxxx Xxxx if a negotiatied settlement was not achieved by year’s end...
Policy Response. A CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT 49
Policy Response. A CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT This chapter aims to explore the concept of policy, and to consider what is meant by policy response. We adopt a “critical postmodern perspective” (Nudzor, 2009) on the implementation of policy, viewing policy as both an attempt to solve problems and an attempt to persuade social actors to subscribe to particular beliefs that delineate action. We share Ball et al’s (2012, p. 8) conviction that ‘few policies arrive fully formed’ and that the processes of policy enactment ‘involve ad-hockery, borrowing, re- ordering, displacing, making do and re-invention’. However, we also endorse Ball’s (1993, p. 12) view that policies ‘create circumstances in which the range of options available in deciding what to do are narrowed or changed’. Consequently, in this chapter we provide an analysis that acknowledges that policy is in part extemporized, and in part the attempt to promote a “de-stated” account of governance.
