FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Sample Clauses

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This is a claim arising out of an accident that occurred on March 28, 2002. Claimant submitted the following documents: 1) Demand for Arbitration with Exhibits A-C received on November 13, 2003. 2) Letter dated March 22, 2004 with Exhibits D-F amending the claim to $2,275.22. Respondent submitted the following documents: 1) Letter dated January 7, 2004. 2) Letter dated March 19, 2004 with Exhibits A-F. Claimant seeks $2,205.22 for dates of service from April 1, 2002 to August 21, 2002 and $70.00 for office consultations on May 21, 2002 and July 10, 2002. Xxxxxxxx contends respondent improperly assessed a PPO reduction on dates of service from April 1, 2002 to August 21, 2002. Claimant contends that he terminated the PPO agreement with CHN on November 12, 2001, 5 monhts prior to the dates of service in issue. Xxxxxxxx has provided a letter from Doctor X'Xxxxxxxx to CHN dated November 12, 2001. The letter states that he would like to terminate the PPO agreement as of November 12, 2001. This letter was faxed on November 12, 2001 to CHN and claimant has provided proof of receipt. Respondent did not terminate the PPO agreement at that time. Doctor X'Xxxxxxxx wrote another letter to XXX dated November 12, 2002 in which he stated that he had not been removed as a provider and again forwarded the November 12, 2001 letter to CHN along with the fax transmittal receipt. XXX then wrote to Doctor X'Xxxxxxxx on December 2, 2002 acknowledging the receipt of Doctor X'Xxxxxxxx'x letter dated November 12, 2002, but ignoring his letter of November 12, 2001. CHN terminated the PPO agreement as of November 12, 2002 instead of November 12, 2001. Respondent argues that Doctor X'Xxxxxxxx'x November 12, 2001 termination letter did not terminate the PPO agreement because the agreement calls for termination via certified mail return receipt requested. I find that Doctor X'Xxxxxxxx'x letter of November 12, 2001 faxed to respondent did terminate his PPO agreement with CHN. Claimant has produced a fax transmittal receipt. Further, XXX acknowledged receipt of the November 12, 2002 letter and did terminate the agreement at that time based on a faxed transmittal not a certified mailing. Based on the foregoing, respondent's PPO reduction was improper as no PPO agreement existed between Doctor X'Xxxxxxxx and CHN at the time the services in issue were provided. I award $2,205.22 on this portion of the claim. Next, claimant seeks payment for office consultations on May 21, 2002 and July 10, 2...
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This is a claim arising out of an accident that occurred on October 18, 2002. Claimant submitted the following documents: 1) Demand for Arbitration with attachments dated April 23, 2003. 2) Letter dated May 30, 2003 with attachments. 3) Letter dated August 27, 2003 with attachments. 4) Letter dated September 15, 2003 with attachments. 5) Letter dated November 30, 2003 with attachments. Respondent submitted the following documents: 1) Letter dated August 11, 2003 with attachments. There are several areas of dispute. First, claimant seeks $862.00 for dates of service from October 22, 2002 to November 12, 2002. This amount represents PPO reductions taken by respondent. Claimant contends that the PPO reductions are invalid. Respondent relies on a CHN Agreement. The DRP has decided this issue and has written several awards. In every case, I have decided that CHN's Agreement is not valid. I concur, in large part, with Judge XxXxx'x decision in the matter of Cluen (Xxxxxx) v. CGU and Xxxxxxxxx (Bidas) v. CGU, Burlington County DC-5437-01 and 5434-01. I find that the CHN Agreement is in violation of the New Jersey PIP Statute and the administrative code. Section 8.1 of the Agreement provides that the provider shall have the sole responsibility for the care and treatment of the eligible person. CHN nor any other party performing utilization management shall have the right to govern the level of care of a patient. This provision is in direct conflict with the PIP statute and the administrative code. In a claim for PIP benefits, the insurer does have the right to limit and/or terminate treatment via decision point reviews, pre-certification requirements and independent medical examinations. Indeed, the adoption of AICRA was enacted to provide cost control measures for medical treatment. The CHN Agreement is in direct conflict with AICRA. Next, I find the agreement is also invalid in that neither CHN nor respondent have the right to refer an insured involved in an automobile accident to a provider. The provider could not legally obtain a referral of an injured person in an automobile accident. An injured insured has the absolute right to select and obtain his or her own medical care. The CHN Agreement is completely silent on the interaction between the agreement and the PIP statute. The agreement is poorly written and ambiguous and does not provide the medical provider with the relationship between the PIP statute and the agreement. As such, the agreement must be cons...
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This is a claim arising out of an accident that occurred on January 3, 2001. Claimant submitted the following documents: 1) Demand for Arbitration dated February 21, 2002.
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. The issue in dispute in this matter is the reduction taken by respondent for a "PPO" . While I have decided this issue a number of times, I have found that a PPO contract is valid and binding on the provider if the terms of the agreement have been properly adhered to and if the provider has been made aware that the insurance carrier is a member of the network applying the reduction. In the matter at hand, respondent has supplied an agreement between CHN and East Bergen Imaging, LLC, D/B/A 401 Medical Imaging that was signed in the spring of 1999 by both parties. The exact effective date is illegible. Section 5 of that agreement (p21) is entitled Time for payment. 5/1 provides that "except where coordination of benefits applies or when a claim is subject to audit, payor or its paying agent shall use all reasonable efforts to make all payments due to participating provider within forty five
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. The within matter arises from an automobile accident which occurred on May 15, 2000. Based upon the date of the accident, I find that the provisions of the 1998 New Jersey “Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act” do apply to the within claim. At issue are the bills of Allcare Medical and Rehabilitation Group. The insured, A.J., treated with this provider under the care of a Xx. Xxxx, who had been previously with Old Hook Medical Group, PA, a separate entity with a separate Tax ID Number. He later became the medical director of Allcare Medical and Rehabilitation Group. Allcare and CHN/PPO Network began negotioations to enter into a contract so Allcare Medical and Rehabilitation Group could join the CHN/PPO Network, but they were never finalized. However, CHN began to take PPO reductions in the bills of Allcare Medical and Rehabilitation Group. It seems from the proofs presented that Old Hook Medical Group had been a CHN Member. Xxxxxxxx argues that based on the proofs presented; certifications, contracts, billing information and correspondence, that it is clear that no contract existed between CHN and Allcare Medical and Rehabilitation Group and that the reductions were taken in error. The outstanding balance claimed is $445.00 No opposition has been submitted to this Demand. Telephone calls were placed at the time of hearing to representatives of Respondent with no reply. As of the date of this award, nothing has been presented to contest the claim. I make no findings as to the validity of any CHN/PPO agreement. I do find that based on the evidence provided, that it is uncontroverted that Allcare Medical and Rehabilitation Group was not a signatory to a contract with CHN and that Respondent was not entitled to any CHN/ PPO reduction. Xx. Xxxx did sign a PPO agreement on behalf of Old Hook, a separate employer and entity and this would in no way bind Allcare. Based upon the uncontroverted evidence presented, I award the entire amount claimed, $445.00. I also award interest as claimed in the amount of $62.72. Claimant has submitted a Certification of Services seeking counsel fees ($1875.00) and costs ($325.00) in this matter. I note that no discovery was engaged in, oral hearing was requested by Xxxxxxxx, and that no complex or novel legal issues were involved in the handling of this matter. Based upon a review of the file, I find that a counsel fee in the amount of $750.00 would be consonant with both the amount of the award and with Rule
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This is a claim arising out of an accident that occurred on July 19, 2001. Claimant submitted the following documents: 1) Demand for Arbitration received on February 28, 2002. 2) The bills in dispute. 3) X-ray reports dated August 8, 2001. 4) MRI reports dated August 17, 2001. 5) Prescription for MRI scans and x-rays. 6) Assignment.
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This is a claim arising out of an accident that occurred on January 19, 2001. Claimant submitted the following documents: 1) Demand for Arbitration received on August 27, 2001 with attachments. 2) Arbitration statement with Exhibits A-F. 3) Letter dated September 6, 2002 with attachments. 4) Certification of services. Respondent submitted the following documents: 1) Letter dated July 12, 2002 with attachments. 2) Letter dated October 11, 2002 with attachments. The amount in issue, $1,470.18, represents a PPO reduction of $1,180.12 and a 50% pre- certification penalty in the amount of $290.06. First, respondent contends that it is entitled to a PPO reduction in that the provider entered into a PPO agreement with Consumer Health Network. I have reviewed the post hearing submissions of the parties. The claimant, Doctor Xxxxxx, did sign a PPO agreement on behalf of Pavonia Medical Associates, 000 Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxxx, Xxx Xxxxxx on August 1, 1996. She signed as the authorized representative of Pavonia Medical Associates. Claimant has also provided a certification from Doctor Xxxxxx. She states that she was an employee of Pavonia Medical Associates on August 1, 1996, the time when she signed the agreement on behalf of Pavonia Medical Associates. In March of 1997, Doctor Xxxxxx opened a private practice at 000 Xxxxx Xxxxx xx Xxxxxxxx, X.X. This practice was separate and apart from Pavonia Medical Associates. She resigned from Pavonia in January of 2001 and opened another facility at 000 00xx Xxxxxx xx Xxxx Xxx Xxxx, X.X. The bill in issue represents services that occurred on February 15, 2001 and March 1, 2001. These services occurred after Doctor Xxxxxx had left Pavonia Medical Associates. Respondent has submitted the certification of Xxxxxx X. Xxxx, Esquire, vice president and corporate counsel for CHN. In essence, Xx. Xxxx asserts that "all covered services rendered by the individual medical provider who has contracted with CHN are subject to the Participating Provider Agreement. Thus, the Participating Provider Agreement follows the individual medical provider." I have reviewed the entire submissions of the parties. I find that the PPO agreement relied upon by respondent does not apply to Doctor Xxxxxx in her individual capacity. Doctor Xxxxxx signed the agreement as an authorized representative of Pavonia Medical Associates. She did not sign an agreement in her individual capacity. The agreement is not binding upon her. The services in issue occurred...
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. AIMCO is a corporation formed under the laws of the State of Maryland. AIMCO does business in at least forty-seven (47) states and the District of Columbia.
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FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This matter concerns a dispute regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits under personal injury protection coverage arising out of an automobile accident that occurred on August 22, 2002. It was submitted to me on the initiative of claimant by way of Demand for Arbitration received by AAA on March 28, 2003. More specifically, this dispute involving medical expense benefits concerns interpretation of the insurance contract and whether the treatment performed was reasonable, necessary, and compatible with the protocols provided for under AICRA. FINDINGS OF FACT: Claimant submitted: Demand for Arbitation received by AAA on March 28, 2003; and Letter dated June 14, 2003. Respondent submitted a letter dated July 9, 2003. On August 22, 2002, DJ was injured in an automobile accident. As a result of his injuries, DJ went to claimant for treatment. On September 30, 2002, claimant treated DJ. More specifically, DJ underwent an MRI of the cervical spine and an MRI of the lumbar spine. On September 30, 2002, claimant submitted the bills for this testing to respondent for payment. Respondent paid the bill for the MRI of the cervical spine subject to a PPO reduction but did not pay for the MRI of the lumbar spine. As a result, claimant filed this Demand for Arbitration. The issue presented is two-fold: (1) whether or not the PPO reduction was proper; and (2) whether or not the MRI of the lumbar spine was medically necessary. Regarding the first issue, claimant argues that the PPO reduction was improper. In support of its argument, claimant relies upon its argument detailed in its June 14, 2003 submission. In summary, claimant argues that the PPO reduction was improper because the PPO contract operates outside the statutory and administrative scheme; respondent is not a direct party to the contract between claimant and CHN and no contract exists between respondent and claimant; and claimant was not notified that respondent had entered into an agreement with CHN to pay claimant. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that its PPO reduction was proper. In support of its argument, respondent relies upon its argument contained in its submission. In summary, respondent argues that AICRA does not preclude a voluntary PPO agreement between private parties. Regarding the second issue, claimant argues that the MRI of the lumbar spine was medically necessary. In support of its argument, claimant relies upon its argument detailed in its June 14, 2003 submission. In short, th...
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Related to FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

  • CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 4 1. The conduct described in the Findings of Fact constitute grounds for disciplinary 5 action pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 32-3552(A)(1) and (3) and violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 32- 6 3501(9)(i) which states, “Any conduct or practice which is contrary to recognized standards of 7 ethics of the respiratory therapy profession or any conduct or practice which does or might 8 constitute a danger to the health, welfare or safety of the patient or the public.” 9 2. The conduct described in the Findings of Fact constitute grounds for disciplinary 10 action pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 32-3552(A)(1) and (3) and violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 32- 11 3501(9)(k), which states, “Violating or attempting to violate, directly or indirectly, or assisting in 12 or abetting the violation of or conspiring to violate a provision of this chapter.” 13 3. The conduct described in the Findings of Fact constitute grounds for disciplinary 14 action pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 32-3552(A)(1) and (3) and violate the provisions of A.A.C. R4-45- 16 or renewal of a license to practice respiratory care.”

  • Litigation; Jurisdiction; Other Matters; Waivers (a) EACH PARTY HERETO ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ANY DISPUTE OR CONTROVERSY BETWEEN OR AMONG THE BORROWER, THE AGENT OR ANY OF THE LENDERS WOULD BE BASED ON DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT AND WOULD RESULT IN DELAY AND EXPENSE TO THE PARTIES. ACCORDINGLY, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, EACH OF THE LENDERS, THE AGENT AND THE BORROWER HEREBY WAIVES ITS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDING OF ANY KIND OR NATURE IN ANY COURT OR TRIBUNAL IN WHICH AN ACTION MAY BE COMMENCED BY OR AGAINST ANY PARTY HERETO ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE NOTES, OR ANY OTHER LOAN DOCUMENT OR BY REASON OF ANY OTHER SUIT, CAUSE OF ACTION OR DISPUTE WHATSOEVER BETWEEN OR AMONG THE BORROWER, THE AGENT OR ANY OF THE LENDERS OF ANY KIND OR NATURE. (b) THE BORROWER, THE AGENT AND EACH LENDER HEREBY AGREES THAT THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION OR, AT THE OPTION OF THE AGENT, ANY STATE COURT LOCATED IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, SHALL HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DETERMINE ANY CLAIMS OR DISPUTES BETWEEN OR AMONG THE BORROWER, THE AGENT OR ANY OF THE LENDERS, PERTAINING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO THIS AGREEMENT, THE LOANS AND LETTERS OF CREDIT, THE NOTES OR ANY OTHER LOAN DOCUMENT OR TO ANY MATTER ARISING HEREFROM OR THEREFROM. THE BORROWER AND EACH OF THE LENDERS EXPRESSLY SUBMITS AND CONSENTS IN ADVANCE TO SUCH JURISDICTION IN ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDING COMMENCED IN SUCH COURTS. EACH PARTY FURTHER WAIVES ANY OBJECTION THAT IT MAY NOW OR HEREAFTER HAVE TO THE VENUE OF ANY SUCH ACTION OR PROCEEDING IN ANY SUCH COURT OR THAT SUCH ACTION OR PROCEEDING WAS BROUGHT IN AN INCONVENIENT FORUM AND EACH AGREES NOT TO PLEAD OR CLAIM THE SAME. THE CHOICE OF FORUM SET FORTH IN THIS SECTION SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO PRECLUDE THE BRINGING OF ANY ACTION BY THE AGENT OR ANY LENDER OR THE ENFORCEMENT BY THE AGENT OR ANY LENDER OF ANY JUDGMENT OBTAINED IN SUCH FORUM IN ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION. (c) THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY EACH PARTY WITH THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL AND WITH A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES THEREOF, AND SHALL SURVIVE THE PAYMENT OF THE LOANS AND ALL OTHER AMOUNTS PAYABLE HEREUNDER OR UNDER THE OTHER LOAN DOCUMENTS, THE TERMINATION OR EXPIRATION OF ALL LETTERS OF CREDIT AND THE TERMINATION OF THIS AGREEMENT.

  • PROVISIONS OF LAW ‌ It is understood and agreed that this Memorandum of Understanding is subject to all current and future applicable Federal, State and County laws; Federal and State regulations; the Charter of the County of Los Angeles, and any lawful rules and regulations enacted by County's Civil Service Commission, Employee Relations Commission, or similar independent commissions of the County. If any part or provision of this Memorandum of Understanding is in conflict or inconsistent with such applicable laws, rules or regulations, or is otherwise held to be invalid or unenforceable by any tribunal of competent jurisdiction, such part or provision shall be suspended and superseded by such applicable law, regulations, or rules, and the remainder of this Memorandum of Understanding shall not be affected thereby.

  • Concerning Applicable Provisions of Law, etc This Agreement shall be subject to all applicable provisions of law, including the applicable provisions of the 1940 Act and to the extent that any provisions herein contained conflict with any such applicable provisions of law, the latter shall control.

  • Violations of Law Beginning with the submission of the UCF DHRL On-Line Agreement, and continuing until termination or cancellation of the Student’s residency, the Student must inform UCF DHRL if the Student: A. has outstanding or pending criminal charges which have not yet been resolved; X. has been adjudicated guilty of a criminal charge; C. has had adjudication withheld on a criminal charge; D. is participating in either a pre-trial diversion or a court ordered probation program on a criminal charge; and/or E. is charged with a criminal violation during the time period described in this paragraph.

  • Conflicts and Interpretation In the event of any conflict between this Agreement and the Plan, the Plan shall control. In the event of any ambiguity in this Agreement, any term which is not defined in this Agreement, or any matters as to which this Agreement is silent, the Plan shall govern including, without limitation, the provisions thereof pursuant to which the Committee has the power, among others, to (a) interpret the Plan, (b) prescribe, amend and rescind rules and regulations relating to the Plan, and (c) make all other determinations deemed necessary or advisable for the administration of the Plan.

  • Calculation of Amounts; Binding Effect of Interpretations and Actions of Master Servicer The Master Servicer will compute the amount of all distributions to be made on the Certificates and all losses to be allocated to the Certificates. In the event that the Master Servicer concludes that any ambiguity or uncertainty exists in any provisions of this Agreement relating to distributions to be made on the Certificates, the allocation of losses to the Certificates or otherwise, the interpretation of such provisions and any actions taken by the Master Servicer in good faith to implement such interpretation shall be binding upon Certificateholders.

  • Sanctions Concerns and Anti Corruption Laws (a) No Loan Party, nor any Subsidiary, nor, to the knowledge of the Loan Parties, any director, officer, employee, agent, affiliate or representative thereof, is an individual or entity that is, or is owned or controlled by any individual or entity that is (i) currently the subject or target of any Sanctions, (ii) included on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals, HMT’s Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets and the Investment Ban List, or any similar list enforced by any other relevant sanctions authority or (iii) located, organized or resident in a Designated Jurisdiction. (b) The Loan Parties and their Subsidiaries have conducted their business in compliance with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, the UK Bxxxxxx Xxx 0000 and other similar anti-corruption legislation in other jurisdictions, and have instituted and maintained policies and procedures designed to promote and achieve compliance with such laws and applicable Sanctions, and to the knowledge of the Borrower, the Loan Parties and their Subsidiaries are in compliance with such anti-corruption laws and applicable Sanctions in all material respects.

  • Intention of the Parties and Interpretation Each of the parties acknowledges and agrees that the purpose of Article XI of this Agreement is to facilitate compliance by the Securities Administrator, the Master Servicer and the Depositor with the provisions of Regulation AB promulgated by the SEC under the 1934 Act (17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1100 - 229.1123), as such may be amended from time to time and subject to clarification and interpretive advice as may be issued by the staff of the SEC from time to time. Therefore, each of the parties agrees that (a) the obligations of the parties hereunder shall be interpreted in such a manner as to accomplish that purpose, (b) the parties’ obligations hereunder will be supplemented and modified as necessary to be consistent with any such amendments, interpretive advice or guidance, convention or consensus among active participants in the asset-backed securities markets, advice of counsel, or otherwise in respect of the requirements of Regulation AB, (c) the parties shall comply (to the extent practical from a timing and information systems perspective) with requests made by the Securities Administrator, the Master Servicer or the Depositor for delivery of additional or different information as the Securities Administrator, the Master Servicer or the Depositor may determine in good faith is necessary to comply with the provisions of Regulation AB, and (d) no amendment of this Agreement shall be required to effect any such changes in the parties’ obligations as are necessary to accommodate evolving interpretations of the provisions of Regulation AB.

  • CHOICE OF LAW, VENUE, JURY TRIAL WAIVER AND JUDICIAL REFERENCE California law governs the Loan Documents without regard to principles of conflicts of law. Borrower and Bank each submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State and Federal courts in Santa Xxxxx County, California; provided, however, that nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to operate to preclude Bank from bringing suit or taking other legal action in any other jurisdiction to realize on the Collateral or any other security for the Obligations, or to enforce a judgment or other court order in favor of Bank. Borrower expressly submits and consents in advance to such jurisdiction in any action or suit commenced in any such court, and Borrower hereby waives any objection that it may have based upon lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, or forum non conveniens and hereby consents to the granting of such legal or equitable relief as is deemed appropriate by such court. Borrower hereby waives personal service of the summons, complaints, and other process issued in such action or suit and agrees that service of such summons, complaints, and other process may be made by registered or certified mail addressed to Borrower at the address set forth in, or subsequently provided by Borrower in accordance with, Section 10 of this Agreement and that service so made shall be deemed completed upon the earlier to occur of Borrower’s actual receipt thereof or three (3) days after deposit in the U.S. mails, proper postage prepaid. WITHOUT INTENDING IN ANY WAY TO LIMIT THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT TO WAIVE THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY, if the above waiver of the right to a trial by jury is not enforceable, the parties hereto agree that any and all disputes or controversies of any nature between them arising at any time shall be decided by a reference to a private judge, mutually selected by the parties (or, if they cannot agree, by the Presiding Judge of the Santa Xxxxx County, California Superior Court) appointed in accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure Section 638 (or pursuant to comparable provisions of federal law if the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts), sitting without a jury, in Santa Xxxxx County, California; and the parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of such court. The reference proceedings shall be conducted pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 638 through 645.1, inclusive. The private judge shall have the power, among others, to grant provisional relief, including without limitation, entering temporary restraining orders, issuing preliminary and permanent injunctions and appointing receivers. All such proceedings shall be closed to the public and confidential and all records relating thereto shall be permanently sealed. If during the course of any dispute, a party desires to seek provisional relief, but a judge has not been appointed at that point pursuant to the judicial reference procedures, then such party may apply to the Santa Xxxxx County, California Superior Court for such relief. The proceeding before the private judge shall be conducted in the same manner as it would be before a court under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. The parties shall be entitled to discovery which shall be conducted in the same manner as it would be before a court under the rules of discovery applicable to judicial proceedings. The private judge shall oversee discovery and may enforce all discovery rules and orders applicable to judicial proceedings in the same manner as a trial court judge. The parties agree that the selected or appointed private judge shall have the power to decide all issues in the action or proceeding, whether of fact or of law, and shall report a statement of decision thereon pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 644(a). Nothing in this paragraph shall limit the right of any party at any time to exercise self-help remedies, foreclose against collateral, or obtain provisional remedies. The private judge shall also determine all issues relating to the applicability, interpretation, and enforceability of this paragraph.

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