MAI Sample Clauses

MAI. Member of the Appraisal Institute

MAI will provide information on sales to JSN as each sale is made. The JSN log will close at 5 P.M. Mountain Time each Thursday for the broadcast week beginning a week from the following Monday. Any advertising time within that broadcast week remaining unsold by MAI at closing will revert to JSN. Complete logs for each broadcast week will be furnished by MAI to JSN one week in advance on the Monday preceding the Monday on which the broadcast begins.

MAI. Corollary 2: If B = B∗, then the only equilibrium is one where all countries join Proof: See appendix 7. The intuition of Corollary 2 is also straight forward. The benchmark B∗ is the value of the rent extraction rate that is chosen by a social planner in a world without information asymmetries. Since the lobbying distortion pushes the desired rent extraction rate below B∗, the time inconsistency distortion alone causes a rent extraction rate above B∗. However, MAI rule B∗ provides to all countries a commitment device to solve the time-inconsistency problem by joining MAI at no cost. Hence, opting out of MAI makes no longer sense. Overall, a weak MAI (large B) is not sharply binding and every country joins MAI to avoid losses from signalling high rent-extraction rates in case of staying out. Next, I compare the incentives of governments to protest against MAI negotiations. Every government objects negotiation if it expects a loss in a world with MAI compared to one without. Proposition 2 Governments of all countries that do not join MAI lose compared to a world without MAI; governments of all countries with χi > χ gain. At least some govern- ˜ ments of countries that join MAI with χi such that χ∗ > χi > χ lose. Proof: See appendix 8. This proposition can explain why some countries object other countries to negoti- ate a MAI even though they are neither forced into nor excluded from membership. A partial MAI, i.e. a MAI where some countries join and others opt out, exerts a negative information externality on non-members; outsiders signal that they are inclined to extract large rents from MNEs. The resulting investment diversion harms governments that do not decide to join. It need to be kept in mind, however, that a loss for a government does not necessarily imply a welfare loss of the country, since government objectives are distorted by lobbying groups.24 Proposition 2 can explain the protest storm of some LDCs against the negotiation of MAI by the club of the OECD countries, although they were both free to opt in or out. According to my explanation, they were fearing the information externality that may arise from the decision to opt out. The protest comes from governments that are ex post but not ex ante contra free-market spirited. Again, a quote by the former Commerce Secretary to Government of India supports this model feature: "Selective and judicious government intervention is therefore widely considered necessary to support or protect domestic in...

MAI. MTCT and NAMR shall maintain their respective PMUs during execution of the Project, with staffing and resources adequate to enable each PMU to effectively implement their respective Part of the Project, and which shall be responsible for financial management, procurement, disbursement, and preparation of progress reports and annual reports in respect of or related to the Project. 3. MEWM shall assign implementation of Part C of the Project to “Apele Romane”, under implementation agreement to be entered into between MEWM and “Apele Romane” not later than thirty (30) days after the Effective Date of this Agreement under terms and conditions acceptable to the Bank. MEWM shall ensure that “Apele Romane” shall have adequate staffing and resources required for implementation of Part C of the Project, and shall have overall responsibility for overseeing and coordinating activities under Part C of the Project. 4. The Borrower, through MAI, MTCT, MEWM and NAMR, shall take all necessary measures to implement the Project in accordance with the PIP and shall not amend, suspend, abrogate, repeal or waive any provision of the PIP without prior approval of the Bank. 5. The Borrower shall ensure that all necessary measures for the carrying out of the EMP shall be taken in a timely manner and shall not amend, suspend, abrogate, repeal or waive any provision of the EMP without prior approval of the Bank. 6. Not later than thirty (30) days after the Effective Date of this Agreement, the Borrower shall establish and thereafter maintain a Project Steering Committee comprising representatives of MAI, MTCT, MEWM and NAMR which shall be responsible for overseeing Project implementation and coordination between Project executing agencies.

MAI. The failed OECD Multilateral Agreement on InvestmentMarket Access – Market access is a legalistic term referring to the government-imposed conditions for an industry to penetrate a related market in a foreign country under non-discriminatory conditions. It is thus the extent to which a good or a service can compete with locally-made products in another market. Cutting market access barriers for industrial products is a key subject of the Doha WTO Round, in particular for products of export interest to developing countries and for environmental goods. - The EU market access strategy created mechanisms and provisions to serve Europe‘s exporters. In practical terms, the main tool is a market access database, available via the Internet. This provides basic information of interest to EU exporters, such as an exporter‘s guide, the rates of customs and internal taxes in key export markets, import licensing requirements and special customs clearance formalities. - An economy in which resources allocations, prices and other marketing decisions are primarily determined by the free market. - Multilateral Environmental Agreements are the best way to deal multilaterally with major environmental issues. But their relationship with trade needs to be clarified. In short, the pursuit of profit must not be allowed to override environmental concerns, nor must such concerns constitute an unwarranted obstacle to trade. For instance, problems could arise if a country imposed a trade measure for environmental purposes on another WTO member that had not signed the MEA. Their relationship with trade and WTO rules needs to be clarified. - Government laws, regulations, rules, procedures, decisions, administrative actions, and any other forms. The term covers central, regional and local authorities; and the rules of non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by any of them. – Abbreviation for ―Mediterranean‖ - In EU terminology the term is used synonymously for countries and territories which have entered into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Under the MEDA Regulation, the 12 Mediterranean countries and territories (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey) are partners of the EU, based on the multilateral document of the Barcelona Declaration. Each of them are legal partners through the Association Agreements and the individual agreements on Financing Framework Conventions (FFC). In a less ...

MAI. The Road Ahead a) The MAI fails to tackle the single most important aspect of international investment taxation, the avoidance of double taxation. Since the tax systems of the major home countries are based on worldwide income taxation principles, their multinational companies are frequently subject to some degree of double taxation. This fact not only xxxxxx international investment, but also provides incentives for the use of tax xxxxxx to channel cross-border capital flows (through the incorporation of offshore holding companies). The use of these schemes is detrimental to the home country, but it also affects recipient countries through both reduced tax revenues and through distorted investment inflows. b) The developing countries - and the smaller low-income countries in particular - would require considerable assistance if they are to accede to the MAI or any other agreement of this type. Wide and semi-permanent exceptions are not the solution, because these would undermine the very rigour which creates confidence among investors. The issue is thus one of raising domestic standards rather than lowering international requirements. c) Such strengthening of domestic standards is a complex, lengthy and expensive undertaking. However, it could bring considerable benefits for foreign as well as domestic firms. In particular, it would involve an overhaul of the system of commercial law - including the courts - and a parallel rationalisation of systems of public registries, accountancy systems, and government regulation. The role of aid donors could be crucial in this regard - providing not just financial support but, more importantly, technical expertise. d) The development impact of MAI on poor countries could be positive if special provision for their accession is made. There is sufficient flexibility in the existing proposal to accommodate developing country interests. De facto exclusion may lead to negative effects such as loss of productive investment and a risk of competitive lowering of legal, fiscal, labour and environmental safeguards. e) The treatment of environmental standards in the preamble to the MAI contains an adequate commitment to international norms and should be acceptable. The proposed inclusion of binding labour standards, although perhaps desirable in a general sense, may not be feasible in practice for developing countries and would effectively prevent their accession. These issues need to be addressed. f) As an essential complement ...

MAI acknowledges that Lenders would not enter into this Amendment without MAI's assurance that MAI has no claim against any of Lenders, their parents companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, attorneys, agents, professionals and servants, or any of their respective predecessors, successors, heirs and assigns (collectively, the "Lender Parties" and each, a "Lender Party"). MAI, for itself and on behalf of its officers and directors, and its respective predecessors, successors and assigns (collectively, the "Releasors") releases each Lender Party from any known or unknown claims which MAI now has against any Lender Party of any nature, including any claims that any Releasor, or any Releasor's successors, counsel and advisors may in the future discover they would have had now if they had known facts not now known to them, whether founded in contract, in tort or pursuant to any other theory of liability, including but not limited to any claims arising out of or related to the Loan Documents or the transactions contemplated thereby. MAI, FOR ITSELF AND ON BEHALF OF EACH RELEASOR, WAIVES THE PROVISIONS OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 1542, WHICH STATE: A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.

MAI. 36/6–54, Pro Memoria al Cay. Xxxxxx Dossi, 19 Sep. 1889, by Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx. Printed in Zaghi, op. cit. 0xx.Xxxxxx Scholar 108 108 Xxxxx, op. cit. 108f., diary 15 July 1890, and 148, diary 18 Aug. 1890. See also 123 and 238 for evidence that Xxxxxxxxx at times spoke with the Emperor without xxxxxxxxxxx.Xxxxxx Scholar 109 109 Ibid. 177f., Traversi to Xxxxxxxxx, 14 Aug. 1890. 110 110 Xxxxxxxxx, op. cit. 000.Xxxxxx Scholar 111 111 A. S. MAI. 36/7–59, Pro Memoria about the audience, undated; printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889–90 XV bis, 0x.Xxxxxx Scholar 112 112 Xxxxx, op. cit. xxxxx., diary 16 July 1890 (italics mine).Google Scholar 113 113 For more evidence that Xxxxxxxxx was supposed by his superiors to know Xxxxxxx, see Xxx. Dipl. 1889–90 XV, 260f., Robilant to Xxxxxxxxx, ii Mar. 1887. It should be noted that Xxxxxxxxx already in 1886 had wrong translations corrected, as he says himself, ‘under my supervision’; Doc. DipI. 1889–1890 XV, 214ff., Xxxxxxxxx to Robilant, ‘Apr. 1886. On the other hand Xxxxxxx kept his interpreter Xxxxx with him also during an interview with Xxxxxxxxx in 1888, which was so secret that Xxxxxxxxx had to swear that he would reveal nothing; A. S. MAI. 36/5-47, Xxxxxxxxx to Xxxxxx, 8 Aug. 1888. The portion about the oath and Xxxxx's presence is missing in the document as printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889–1890 XV, 000xx.Xxxxxx Scholar 114 114 Xxxxxxx, Xxxxx, op. cit. 44, n. 1. I do not know when and under what circumstances Xxxxxxxxx made this statement. Xxxxx Xxxxxxx does not give the source of his information, and in the Italian papers that I have seen so far I have not been able to discover xx.Xxxxxx Scholar 115 115 Doc. Dipl. 1890–1891 XVII, 63ff., Xxxxxxxxx to Xxxxxx, 29 Jan. 0000.Xxxxxx Scholar 116 116 Xxxxx, op. cit. 186, Xxxxxxxxx to Xxxxxx, 9 Oct. 1890. ‘Now I understand how one can obtain so eailv such splendid success. One rites a treaty: iii the Italian text one puts what is wanted in Italy, in the Amharic text one puts what Xxxxxxx xxxx, and it doesn't matter if the two do not agree. Those who come later will think about it. What a mess, my dear Xxxxxx, what imbroglios, what lies, what an enormous difference between this king and King Xxxxxxxx!-the same as between the King of Italy and Minilik. I owe much to A…, I cannot pose as his accuser. But when I tried to put the blame for the false translation of Article r of the treaty with Xxxxxxx on Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxx, he gave me such details and reasons that he shut my mouth, proving tome that. ...

MAI. It has been assumed that Xxxxxx himself removed them when he left xxxXxx. See Xxxxxx, op. cit.

MAI. 36/2-13; Article 7 in the Italian draft and 6 in the Amharic draft. The Italian text is printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889–1890 XV, 143f. The Amharic text of the article runs in full: This is a somewhat complex and obscure sentence, which is not easy to render into acceptable English without paraphrasing it completely. The following is an attempt to convey the meaning of the clause without changing it more than necessary: ‘When I said: if Your Majesty should wish by Your own will to send messengers to Egypt, to Jerusalem, to the Red Sea [or] anywhere else by the hand [or: under the protection] of the Italian consul, I meant so that anyone who does not know should not maltreat them and that they should return having carried out Your will without lacking food, drink, [and] shelter; if You send whatever You wish by any of the Italian consuls, everything You desire should be done and fulfilled’.Google Scholar 131 131 MAE., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 266f., Originally Xxxxxxxx, then stationed at L–1890 XV, 128ff. The Amharic text has never been published, and Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxxx, the present official historian of Italian political activity in Ethiopia, writing for the ‘Comitato per la documentazione dell’ opera dell'Italia in Africa', seems to have been ignorant even of the existence of the original of the treaty in the archives. See M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 282, n. 00.Xxxxxx Scholar 132 132 A. S. MAE., Serie V, Trattati, Etiopia No. 2. The Italian text was first published in Doc. DipI. 1889–90 XV, iz8ff. The Amharic text has never been published, and Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxxx, the present official historian of Italian political activity in Ethiopia, writing for the ‘Comitato per la documentazione dell'opera dell'Italia in Africa’, seems to have been ignorant even of the existence of the original of the treaty in the archives. See M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 282, 51.