Subsidy policy. As a result of the economic reform programmes imple- mented during the 1990s, the trend has been the reduction and elimination of sub- sidies in various areas. Are these policies necessarily sound? This issue has at- tracted some attention in Nepal, notably in the context of subsidies on tube xxxxx. However, the quality of the analysis and also the debate on this and other subsidy issues (e.g. irrigation, fertilizers and so on) has not been as intense as desirable. As a result, the government has not been able to convince all stakeholders and there are at times signals of policy reversal. Second, subsidies and investments are two different things and serve different purposes while resources are fungible, which means that the analysis and debate needs also to address the trade-offs in- volved. This particular debate has been going on in India for some time, where analysts seem to blame the rapidly increased input subsidies for similarly declining agricultural investment. A sound and transparent subsidy policy, fully backed by analyses, is also essential because there is a growing trend in Nepal whereby vari- ous stakeholders lobby for subsidies on the ground that agriculture is highly subsi- dized in India. The government, notably the MoAC, needs sound analyses to ex- plain its position on this and other issues. References APROSC & JMA (1995), Agricultural Perspective Plan, Kathmandu Agricultural Projects Services Centre (APROSC) and Xxxx Xxxxxx Associates (JMA) ANZDEC (2002), Agriculture Sector Performance Review: Final Report, Volume1. ANZDEC Limited, New Zealand. Xxxxx, Xxxx (2003), New Members of the WTO: Their Commitments in Agriculture and Provisions Proposed in the Doha Negotiations, Contributed paper to Inter- national Agricultural Trade Research Consortium Conference on Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are We Heading? June 2003, Capri, Italy. Xxxxxx, N. Hag (2000), “Domestic Support Measures”, FAO Resource Manual on Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture, FAO Rome. xxx.xxx.xxx/xxxxx Xxxxxx, X. and X. Xxxxxxxxx (2003), The Subsidy Syndrome in Indian Agriculture, Oxford University Press Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx (2002), Nepal Country Agricultural Sector Brief. Submitted to FAO Regional office for Asia & the Pacific, Bangkok. MoAC (2000), Fertilizer Trade Liberalization in Nepal, Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Fertilizer unit, Kathmandu, November 1999. NARC (2001), Vision 2011 - Agricultural Research Strategy for Sustainable Live...
Subsidy policy. When registering my child for summer camp I agree to pay any required co-payments, family fees, fees incurred due to unexcused absences and care beyond hours specified on the Child Care Certificate. Any remaining monthly/camp balances that the subsidy provider does not pay I will be responsible for paying at the end of the month. Family fees are due the first of every month (June 1st, July 1st, and August 1st). I will review my contract carefully so that I know what I will be responsible for paying. Most subsidies will not cover the August session of summer camp and the required After School tuition for August. They will only cover one and I will be responsible to pay the rest. I understand a credit card must be on file for all subsidy campers and will automatically be charged if payment is not received by the above due dates. I will pay any unfunded portion of summer fees and after school fees in August. Camp Policies I will have my camper arrive to camp no later than 9:00 a.m. unless otherwise posted or requested by camp. If my camper arrives late to camp they may not be accepted that day and may be demi†ed from camp if it becomes habitual. I will read the information board at each camp. It is the responsibility of whoever is dropping off or picking up the camper to check the board for important detailed information. Traditional Camp goes on fieldtrips each week. Fieldtrips are time sensitive and the bus cannot wait for late campers. I understand if I arrive aGer the time indicated on the information board my child/xxx may not be able to attend the fieldtrip that day and I will need to make alternative care arrangements with no refund. I will provide a valid photo ID (not a photo of an ID) when picking up my camper and only list people who are over 18 years old as authorized to pick up my child from camp. I will provide a full signature and time for each camper when dropping off or picking up. The sign in/out is kept at the administrative desk at all camps. I will notify the people authorized to pick up my camper to bring a valid photo ID and to be prepared to show it and to follow these procedures. I will not use nicknames, I understand the name on the application must match the name on the driver’s license exactly or valid photo ID for all persons authorized to pick up my camper. I understand that arguing or disputing with staff that request to see an ID may result in my camper being suspended or demitted from camp. I will notify the camp when someone other...
Subsidy policy. 4.3.1 Bridging the gap between energy access full cost and willingness to pay The need for subsidies Solar energy technologies imply a high upfront cost that is not affordable by target populations. In order to support the development of solar electrification in the country, it is thus necessary to design a subsidy policy that will bridge the gap between the technology full cost and the ability to pay of rural households. Subsidies for renewable technologies are even more needed as the price of conventional energy is still being subsidized by the GoI. Finding equilibrium between commercial financing and subsidies The unsuccessful experience of BRI, who tried a credit product for SHS access on a fully commercial price, demonstrated that a financial scheme without subsidies is not likely to be sustainable and to reach rural, poor populations in Indonesia. On the other hand, the problems of lack of ownership and maintenance experienced through Indonesian government programs indicated that a fully-subsidized scheme is not effective neither (low outreach, material break down) and can generate negative secondary effects (social jealousy, market distortion). As demonstrated by the Bangladeshi IDCOL experience, the solution lies in combining a commercial and a social approach. To be efficient, a national solar program has to find equilibrium between households’ contributions (for sense of ownership, outreach and sustainability) and subsidies (for affordability). What to subsidize In scenario 1 (IDCOL financial model), the subsidy can be applied at two levels: ▪ Subsidize the cost of capital by providing soft loans to MFIs, who can in turn offer microcredits to end-users at a lower interest rate. This type of subsidy reduces the total cost of the technology for the borrower, and is usually relatively cheaper and more sustainable than a direct subsidy on material. ▪ Subsidize part of the cost of material by providing a grant. This type of subsidy may still be necessary in order to expand the market segment for SHS, allowing more households to access solar energy technologies. In the IDCOL model, the grant provided to MFIs enables to decrease the price of the SHS, as well as to cover promotion and maintenance expenses, which are essential to the sustainability of the financial model. In scenario 2 (pay-for-service model), the subsidy can be applied at the following levels: ▪ Finance the installation costs: even if some small installation fees can be charged to the cu...
