Analysis and Conclusion. The application does not demonstrate that review is warranted. In its application, ACT alleges only that there is “no rational basis” for the RD’s decision.21 ACT supports this allegation by listing certain community-of-interest factors the RD considered related to the individual treatment facilities, such as “geographic proximity, unique conditions of employment, [and] . . . distinct local concerns.”22 The Authority may grant an application for review “only when the application demonstrates that review is warranted on one or more of” the grounds provided in § 2422.31(c) of the Authority’s Regulations.23 20 Id. at 24-25 (citing Dep’t of the Army, U.S. Army Aviation Missile Command (AMCOM), Redstone Arsenal, Ala., 56 FLRA 126, 131 (2000) (holding that, where multiple unions file successorship petitions following a reorganization, an election is not required if one union represents more than seventy percent of new unit); Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Sacramento, Cal. & Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Ukiah Dist. Off., Ukiah, Cal., 53 FLRA 1417, 1422 (1998) (holding that, where one union is involved, an election is unnecessary if union represents more than fifty percent of new unit)). 21 Application at 2. 22 Id.
Analysis and Conclusion. NASA to perform a write-up on shield performance based on test results. Amazon seeks to understand various levels of damage for the COPV and Battery. For the COPV, NASA will provide ballistic limit equations describing penetration without rupture and penetration with rupture. For the Battery, NASA will provide ballistic limit equations for penetration of enclosure without cell damage, single cell damage, and multiple cells damaged. An update of the risk assessment shall be provided by NASA based on the aforementioned analysis. Amazon will use reasonable efforts to:
Analysis and Conclusion. One of historical institutionalism’s strengths is that it reminds one to focus on how all interested actors interact within all relevant institutions, be they international, regional or domestic. In a subject area like copyright, where analyses usually focus on domestic laws or international treaties, its sensitivity to how these “levels” interact with the added “level” of the region, is particularly helpful. An examination of these three mini-case studies through this lens of historical institutionalism demonstrates the extent to which the Can- adian, US and Mexican decisions to implement (or not) the Internet treat- ies, and the manner of implementation, have been shaped primarily by domestic, not regional, politics. It has failed to observe any strong region- al institutional or regional-actor influences. To the extent that any clearly North American dynamic is at work, it involves
Analysis and Conclusion. Was the Defendant in breach of the covenants in the Lease? [6] The Claimant submitted, that the Defendant was in breach of the covenants in Clause 4(3), 4(4), 4(15) and 4(18) of the said Lease, by which it covenanted:
Analysis and Conclusion. The Agency fails to establish that the award is based on nonfacts. The Agency argues that the award is based on nonfacts. To establish that an award is based on a nonfact, the excepting party must show that a central fact underlying the award is clearly erroneous, but for which the arbitrator would have reached a different result.5 Disagreement with an arbitrator’s evaluation of evidence, including the weight to be accorded such evidence, does not provide a basis for finding that an award is based on a nonfact.6 In this regard, the Authority has held that the 1 Award at 2. 2 Id.
Analysis and Conclusion. The findings support the hypothesis that race influences how an individual’s voter registration application is processed and the particular code used to reject them. The data also make it apparent that an exceedingly large number of Georgians of all races are being purged off of the roles due to general inactivity. Given that the data on rejections came directly from the Secretary of State’s office, there is no reason to believe it contains many inaccuracies. This eliminates most clerical limitations or sources of error in this, making the findings more legitimate. There is, however, plenty of room for further investigation. The challenge of identifying the actual system that creates each reason still persists. For example, the Not Verified reason was tied to the exact-match process, but for Duplicate, for example, the actual process used remains somewhat unknown. As noted above, there may be some anthropological reasons, such as a tendency for Southerners to name their children after themselves, or a prevalence of names with special characters, that might explain why there are so many duplicates, but it remains difficult to know what is going on on a large scale. Answering how and why each of these reasons may be skewed would probably require extensive interviews and observation of the actual process from start to finish, but could illustrate where the xxxx areas are in the process. The controls included in this analysis and the interviews I conducted do try to address this issue of providing explanations by accounting for factors such as gender, age, and the urban/rural index of the county in which each individual resides. The resource argument provided by Xxxxx, Xxxxx and Schlozman might also provide further insight into the patterns in each rejection reason (Xxxxx et al 1995). Rather than just controlling for socioeconomic factors, their study asked why people do not participate in politics. They found that people either can’t, they don’t want to, or nobody asked them to (Xxxxx et al 1995). They argue that voting (and here registering by extension) is driven primarily by interest, though civic skills and education also are influential (Xxxxx et al 1995). Thus, in the future it could be informative to add in the variable for free time as well as for civic skills, which is different from just general educational attainment. These are essentially more nuanced understandings of resources that could be correlated with specific reasons for rejection. With th...
Analysis and Conclusion. Based on this data, white majority boards were not correlated with higher rejection rates of minorities. Neither the size of the county, its urban rural status, the average household income of the county, the educational attainment rates of the county, or the combination of a majority white board and a high percentage of minorities had any consistent influences, either. The only consistent finding was that as a particular minority group made up a higher percentage of the electorate, they were also rejected at higher rates—except for blacks. Interestingly, in the 1963 study mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the percent of blacks in the county population in 1950 was the most strongly correlated factor with a decrease in black registration rates (Xxxxxxxx and Xxxxxxx 1963, 28). The most obvious limitation to this model is the lack of a complete data set given that about 50 counties in each year are missing. The missing counties limit the power of the model and may distort findings. Though, to be sure, some of the unresponsiveness can be explained by underfunded and understaffed county offices, the frequency of the unresponsiveness coupled with the Secretary of State’s office inability (or perhaps unwillingness) to provide a list of current county board members illustrates a concerning lack of transparency. All of the county elections board members are public officials— either elected or appointed—whose names should be available following a basic public information request. As mentioned in the data and methods section of this chapter, there were some patterns in the 51 unresponsive counties—mostly that poorer, smaller and more rural counties were more prominent in this group than they are compared to all counties. 74% of the unresponsive counties had populations of less than 25,000 people. Out of the 159 total counties, only 54% have populations of less than 25,000. 65% of the unresponsive counties had urban-rural indicators of 6-9, whereas of all of the counties only 47% have urban-rural codes 6-9. Also, 29 of the 51 counties came from the bottom 1/3 of poorest counties in Georgia, as measured by per-capita income in 2015. These patterns suggest that resource limitations may be responsible for some of the unresponsiveness. Geographically, there were no major patterns of the unresponsive patterns being from any particular region of the state. Racially, the unresponsive counties had a wide range of compositions. Many were majority white but few ove...
Analysis and Conclusion. This dispute is not grievable or arbitrable as a matter of law. The Agency argues that the award is contrary to law but does not specifically challenge the arbitrability of the grievance.20 However, the award “cannot stand if [the arbitrator] lacked jurisdiction to resolve the [grievance] in the first place.”21 As the Authority may evaluate an arbitrator’s substantive-arbitrability determination sua sponte,22 we first consider whether this dispute was grievable or arbitrable.23 The Union grieved, as relevant here, whether the Agency improperly denied the grievant her statutory due-process rights when it chose not to convert her to a permanent position.24 In enacting the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Congress granted agencies the statutory right to terminate certain individuals without following the due-process procedures set forth in 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303 and 7512. For example, Congress granted agencies the statutory right to terminate probationary employees with minimal due process.25 And, in U.S. DOJ, INS v. FLRA (INS),26 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (the D.C. Circuit) concluded that allowing probationary employees to challenge adverse actions through arbitration would “undermine[] the scheme Congress envisioned when it excluded probationary employees from [5 U.S.C. §§] 4303 and 7513.”27 The court found that giving arbitrators the power to reinstate probationary employees through the grievance process would be “inconsistent with OPM’s regulations” and would “usurp[] the authority Congress conferred on OPM” to issue rules to help implement the CSRA.28 Since that decision, the Authority has repeatedly held that a grievance concerning the termination of a probationary 20 Exceptions Br. at 10-16.
Analysis and Conclusion. The award is consistent with § 7116(a)(7) of the Statute. prohibited immediate enforcement of the executive order where it conflicted with provisions of the extended agreement. The Agency notes that the President issued the executive order in accordance with his authority to regulate the civil service under 5 U.S.C. § 7301.25 The Authority has recognized in negotiability disputes that executive orders issued pursuant to statutory authority “are to be accorded the force and effect” of a “law” enacted by Congress.26 However, recognizing that an executive order has the force and effect of law does not mean that the executive order is beyond the reach of § 7116(a)(7)’s enforcement bar. Indeed, the Authority has recognized that several types of regulations are accorded the force and effect of law, but they remain regulations that are subject to § 7116(a)(7)’s enforcement The Agency argues that the executive order was a government-wide regulation that the Agency had the authority to implement immediately upon its issuance.21 Because the award faulted the Agency’s immediate implementation, the Agency argues that the award should be set aside as contrary to law.22 However, the Agency’s argument ignores § 7116(a)(7)’s clear prohibition on enforcing rules and regulations that “conflict with any applicable collective[-]bargaining agreement if the agreement was in effect before the date the rule or regulation was prescribed.”23 The Arbitrator found that, under the plain wording of the continuance clause, the extended agreement was in effect before the President issued the executive order.24 Thus, § 7116(a)(7) 19 Id. at 18.
Analysis and Conclusion. [65] There is no evidence that there was ever a written lease setting forth the terms of the rental between the Claimant and Defendant. Although the Defendant pleaded that the agreement to rent the factory shell was entered into in terms of a draft lease attached to its Defence, its sole witness Xxx. Xxxxxx admitted that no leases were ever prepared for these tenants. I also note that by letter dated 14th November 2016, the Defendant’s Xx. Xxxxxx informed the Claimant that a search of the defendant’s records revealed that no instructions were ever issued for the preparation of a lease for the factory shell which he rented from the defendant. Even further, by letter dated 26 August 2013, the defendant’s Xxxxx Xxxx repeatedly described the claimant’s tenancy as ‘your current 25 year 26 Paragraph 28 of Xxx. Xxxxxx’x Witness Statement 27 Transcript page 112 lines 25 to 31;page 113 lines 1 to 2 28 Page 133 Transcript lines 1- 11. leasing arrangement’. No reference was ever made to an existing draft lease or any changes to its clauses relative to the proposed new lease being offered. The above led me to conclude on a balance of probability that no such draft lease existed; rather, that the terms of the claimant’s tenancy were as noted in the Defendant’s letter of offer dated November 27 1996. No provision for termination of the tenancy after the factory became unfit for use after two years was included therein. It therefore follows that the Defendant’s termination of the tenancy in February 2014 was unlawful. As a result there was an unexpired period of the tenancy amounting to three years ten months. [66] The fact however, that the Claimant paid insurance premiums does not by itself entitle him to the proceeds of such policy upon the happening of the event insured against. It seems to me that it is the owner of the insured property, on whom the responsibility of replacement lay, who would be entitled to such proceeds of the policy. On the facts of this case that was the Defendant- as such the Claimant, as admitted in its closing submissions is not entitled to receipt of the proceeds of the policy or any part thereof. [67] On the issue of whether the Defendant took reasonable steps to relocate the Claimant, of note is the fact that the options presented to the Claimant contained materially different and disadvantageous terms than that of the current tenancy. In 2013, Xx. Xxxx offered the Claimant an option of a twenty five year or ninety nine year lease but in b...
