City Position. The City proposes this language as another aspect of its overall goal of reducing overtime expenditures. Firefighters will still be able to use compensatory time at their discretion within ninety days as long as this use will not force the City to fill the original shift on an overtime basis. The proposed language allows the City to pay overtime in lieu of compensatory time off if an alternative comp day cannot be arranged within ninety days.
City Position. The City argues that the firefighters already work fewer days per year than other City employees and therefore enjoy significantly more time off than their counterparts in other bargaining units. Whereas all other City employees work over 200 days per year the firefighters work only 81 to 85 days annually. Although they work 24-‐hour shifts, when not responding to a call they are permitted to sleep on beds provided to them at the stations. Moreover, their shift configuration allows them to schedule vacations in a manner that maximizes their time away from work; firefighters using two weeks of vacation in a row can be off duty for 21 days consecutive days. A fifth week of vacation would permit this to be expanded to the functional equivalent of 45 days. When the Agreement’s other generous leave benefits are added in, bargaining unit members enjoy an inordinately large amount of time off, a situation that is already causing unaffordable levels of overtime expenditure. Discussion Although M.G.L. c. 41 § 111D governs vacation leave for both police and firefighters, since the Holyoke decision interpreted the statute in a manner than afforded police officers eligibility for a 5th week of vacation, Woburn’s firefighter bargaining unit has been the only in which the most senior employees are not permitted to accrue a 5th week of vacation. The City’s arguments about the number of days per year firefighters work (as compared to other City workers with more traditional shift assignments) notwithstanding, Firefighters are not on duty working for the City any fewer hours than are other City employees. In fact, their 24 hour shift assignments result in more hours “on the clock” than fellow City employees in other bargaining units. Significantly, all but one of the Union’s comparable communities and many of the City’s comparable communities provide a fifth week of vacation time for senior firefighters, and many of these cities and towns also utilize 24 hour scheduling for their firefighters. For these reasons the panel is persuaded that adding a fifth week of vacation benefit for the most senior firefighters is appropriate. In an effort to balance a step toward parity with a recognition of the City’s legitimate fiscal constraints, we award the a fifth week of vacation to firefighters of all ranks after twenty (20) years of service rather than the fifteen (15) years sought by the Union.
City Position. The City points out that the fifteen-‐day sick leave accrual benefit predates the 1994 shift to 24-‐hour scheduling with its resulting frequency of work. For example, firefighters work 27% fewer shifts than do DPW employees and 25% fewer shifts than police officers. Through this proposal the City is attempting to curb suspected sick leave abuse. The total number of sick hours used since 2009 has ranged from a low of 2,488 hours in FY 2010 to a whopping 4,643 hours in FY 2012. Human Resources Director Cox testified that there was a great deal of single-‐day usage and even cases in which employees were sick for the day shift but able to work the night shift the same day.
City Position. The City’s argument in favor of this proposal is essentially the same as that articulated above; the City suspects that firefighters are abusing sick leave benefits and seeks language that would augment its ability to prevent this. Whereas the current language already permits discipline for sick leave absences not related to illness or injury, the proposed change specifies some situations in which discipline would be justified.
City Position. The City has moved to dismiss the Union’s xxxxxxx proposal, asserting that it effectively amounts to a question of assignment that is not permitted under the JLMC statute and not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The City suggests that the Union’s proposal has been a moving target that attempts to couch as a mandatory subject of bargaining (per piece xxxxxxx) what is in its essence a proposal for minimum shift assignments. The City next argues that its current xxxxxxx requirements are in full compliance with guidance promulgated by OSHA and NFPA. OSHA guidelines for interior structural firefighting require four firefighters, two inside the structure and two outside of it. Moreover, NFPA is a private trade organization; the Commonwealth has not adopted its guidelines as mandatory regulations. Indeed, as Company witness Xxxxx pointed out, the Annex to NFPA Standard 1710 provides that that it is within the discretion of the municipality to determine the acceptable level of risk and what is appropriate staffing for the community. In this case, the City of Woburn should have the authority and discretion to determine what scope and level of service should be provided by its Fire Department. The City asserts that the Union’s xxxxxxx proposal has been a moving target that does not seriously address the cost issues. When pressed, Union representatives continually say, “three per piece,” essentially deflecting the difficult questions about how to accomplish that. At a minimum, this would require the City to hire four additional firefighters, resulting of an increase of 5.25% in the Fire Department budget. Addressing the testimony of its own expert witness, who suggested that a cost-‐effective way to address the per-‐piece xxxxxxx proposal would be to close a fire station and consolidate staff to the remaining stations, the City argues that the JLMC is not the appropriate forum for addressing such a core managerial prerogative. Given the comprehensive nature of the MRI report, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Panel to focus on one component of the Report. Discussion One of the essential features of the Massachusetts Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law, M.G.L. c. 150E and the case law that has developed since it was enacted is an effort at the delicate balancing of managerial prerogatives to operate the governmental enterprise and employee rights to engage in collective bargaining over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. The positions ...
City Position. The City asserts that the proposed increase in the EMT stipend is a staggering 128%. As an annual increase in base salary this amounts to an additional 3%. Since the EMT stipend is added to base salary, this will also drive up already excessive overtime costs. Only five of the City’s comparable communities have an EMT stipend at all. Although six or the seven communities the Union is using as comparables have EMT stipends larger than those in Woburn, the Union’s proposal exceeds even the highest of its comparables.
City Position. While the City has weathered the financial crisis through conservative management, it continues to face challenges that include even-‐increasing costs of providing excellent health insurance coverage for its employees, reductions in local aid and the need to invest in capital improvements including the replacement of school buildings and upgrades or replacement of public safety buildings. The citizens of Woburn, a largely blue-‐collar community, face challenges in supporting the tax burden brought about by these circumstances. In advocating for its selected comparable communities, the City argues that all of the contiguous communities are included based on the fact that its firefighters are drawn from the same labor pool. The Union’s selected communities are not in the Metro Boston market area with the exception of Burlington, Watertown and Xxxxxxx. Then, to make these random communities appear comparable, the Union has inappropriately “averaged” them. The City chose the non-‐contiguous communities of Arlington, Belmont, Waltham, Natick, Needham and Melrose based on their similarity in population, per capita income and EQV value. The City suggests that its 3% wage offer over the term of this agreement maintains parity with contiguous and comparable communities and is consistent with the City’s pattern for its public safety bargaining units, particularly when police officers who were not Xxxxx Xxxx eligible before October 2009 are factored in. Indeed, it is non-‐Xxxxx Xxxx eligible police officers who will be lagging behind firefighters. The City stresses that the Union’s attempt to frame restored Xxxxx Xxxx benefits as wage increases in belied by the fact that the Firefighters already explicitly received the benefit increases aimed at achieving Xxxxx Xxxx related parity back in 1998 and through a JLMC award. Turning to the statutory factor of ability to pay, the City asserts that the Union mistakenly claims that the City has 25.7 millions available within the FY 2013 budget to fund the Union’s demands. Yet much of this funding is statutorily restricted to particular uses such as school construction and affordable housing. Indeed, the Department of Revenue has certified just over $8 million as being “free cash.” The City suggests that even this is not wisely used to fund recurring costs such as wage and benefit increases; best financial practices would dictate using “free cash” for one-‐time expenditures such as capital outlays. Contrary to the Union’s...
City Position. Section 13.5 of the 2013 Development Agreement states that "the City retains the right to settle any litigation brought against it in its sole and absolute discretion . . ." On March 23, 2018, the City issued a letter raising concerns, notwithstanding CEMEX's March 1, 2018 letter, including with respect to the process by which the approvals were issued for the CEMEX Project, although the City further stated that these views were preliminary and subject to further review and analysis. In light of these concerns, the City raised the possibility of taking a positon consistent with certain claims raised by Petitioner.
City Position. The City argues that Xxxxxxxx violated the N13PD Rules of Conduct and Policies and his .conduct constitutes just cause for termination. The City points out that the investigation into Xxxxxxxx's actions of June 4~2007 were initiated as a result of two supervisors sensing something was wrong with the explanation by Xxxxxxxx of the circumstances sUlToundingthe incident. First, the City argues, Xxxxxxxxxx heard the dispatch call to 109 Torkom Drive and felt there was no need for her presence as the call did not present any extenuating circlill1Stances. After she heard a call for a medic, she believed the injury resulted from the domestic incident. Neither Grievant nor Boslde caned for a supervisor. After Xxxxxxxxxx was told by Xxxxxx that Xxxxx spit on Xxxxxxxx, she went to see Xxxxx in the booldng room and noticed his extensive injuries. After reviewing Xxxxxxxx's report, she believed the degree of force used on the handcuffed Roguz was excessive. Xxxxxxxxxx told Xxxxxxxx that he should have called for a supervisor and Xxxxxxxx had no response to POlialatin's statement. Xxxxx. had concerns after Xxxxxxxx inquired whether "spitting" constituted a felony. Xxxxxxxx repeated the spitting ~tatement a couple more times to Xxxxxx. Xxxxx advised the Chief of what happened and the Chief concluded, after reviewing all the doctor's reports, photographs and other evidence, that Xxxxxxxx used excessive force not done for a legal purpose. The City argues that the investigation the NBPD conducted detennined that Xxxxxxxx provided many different and conflicting versions of the incident. These versions, by Xxxxxxxx, according to the City, included:
